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EMU and the euro will face a number of challenges in the future. Two such challenges are
examined here, first, the endurance prospects for the euro, and second, the inflation
performance of the euro area during the coming ten years How will it respond to them?
This report provides a set of tentative answers based on the history of monetary unions and
of stabilization policies. This body of evidence is exploited as the prime basis for
conjectures and forecasts presented.
First, the most common challenges suggested by the economics profession concerning
EMU and the euro are presented, grouped under four major headings: (1) fiscal policy
making, (2) monetary policy making, (3) the euro area being a non-optimal currency area,
and (4) the political legitimacy of EMU. Second, the major lessons for EMU from the
history of monetary unions are summarized and confronted with these standard objections
to evaluate how EMU will presumably respond to them. Two basic conclusions emerge.
First, the euro area is organized as a centralized monetary union, an institutional set-up that
facilitates endurance. Second, policy-makers within EMU are and will be involved in a
process of policy learning. This process of learning by doing increases the long run
viability of EMU.
Next, as price stability is the prime policy goal of the ECB, challenges to this policy
objective are considered in three steps. First, the historical record of monetary and fiscal
stability in Europe is presented. Second, this evidence is used to evaluate potential shocks
to the price level of the euro area in the future. Third, even if the ECB successfully
maintains price stability in the coming decade, its policy paradigm, as enshrined in the
legislation underlying the euro-system, may be challenged. A number of such challenges,
distilled from the history of stabilisation policies, are explored.
Our basic benchmark is that by year 2010 Europe will have experienced ten years of far-
reaching monetary unification. To illustrate the dynamics of European monetary
integration and cooperation, counterfactuals to this benchmark are briefly examined in an
appendix. Here the likelihood of European monetary unification to emerge via routes
different from that of the Maastricht treaty are discussed. In other words, we try to answer
the question: is the euro bound to happen?
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1. Introduction
1
The creation of the EMU and the euro is a unique event. Never before has a group of
independent nation-states given up their national currencies to form a common monetary
union based on a new unit of account under the leadership of a common monetary
authority – while still retaining political independence. Economic policies – except for
monetary policy – will primarily be framed by the individual member states or by
coordination through a system of persuasion, peer pressure and procedures presently being
set in motion.
EMU is thus a gigantic experiment with no precedence in monetary history. EMU will
have effects on practically every area of economic policy-making in Europe: it will
influence the allocation of resources, the distribution of income, stability and growth, as
well as the formal and informal institutions on labor, product and financial markets within
the euro area. EMU will most likely affect Europe’s economic and political landscape in
the future in fundamental, but as yet, unknown ways. In short, monetary history is
presently in the making in Europe.
The euro, the newborn currency, will face a number of challenges during the first decade
of the 21
st century. The purpose of this report is to focus on two such challenges: first, the
endurance prospects for the euro, and second, the inflation performance of the euro area
during the coming ten years.
The history of monetary unions and of stabilization policies is exploited as the prime basis
for the conjectures and forecasts presented. Of course, the future is by definition unknown
territory, but history, “properly” interpreted, can serve as a valuable source for extracting
hypothetical conclusions concerning things to come. The science of economics can be
viewed as the search for common patterns across time, countries, cultures and institutions.
This study is an exercise in this tradition. The use of history is an well-accepted
methodology for forecasting. Actually, it is the only basis for forecasting.
This study is organized in the following way. First, the most common challenges suggested
by the economics profession concerning the future of EMU are presented. Second, the
major lessons for EMU from the history of monetary unions are summarized and
confronted with these standard objections to evaluate how EMU will presumably respond
to them. Here focus is on the viability of EMU. Next, as price stability is the prime policy
goal of the ECB, challenges to this policy objective are considered in three steps. First, the
historical record of monetary and fiscal stability in Europe is presented. Second, this
evidence is used to describe potential shocks to the future price level of the euro area.
Third, even if the ECB successfully maintains price stability in the coming decade, its
policy may be challenged. We explore a number of such non-conventional challenges to
1 Within ECFIN I owe thanks to Anne Brunila, Reinhard Felke, Harry Huizinga, Philippe Mills, Cecilia
Mulligan, Karl Pichelmann, Heikki Oksanen, André Sapir and Helena Sjögren. Karel Havik has skillfully
prepared the charts. Outside ECFIN Michael Artis, Michael D. Bordo, Filipo Cesarano, Benjamin Cohen,
James Foreman-Peck, Hans Genberg, Thomas Hagberg, Michael Hutchison, Ivo Maes, Michael Oliver, Kurt
Schuler, seminar participants at UC Santa Barbara, at UC Santa Cruz, at the Fourth Conference of the
European Historical Economics Society, Oxford, and at the European Institute in Florence have given me
constructive advice. The usual disclaimer applies.8
the price stability goal, all pertaining to the policy paradigm enshrined in the legislation
underlying the euro-system.
Our basic benchmark is that by year 2010 Europe has experienced ten years of far-reaching
monetary unification. To illustrate the dynamics of European monetary integration and
cooperation, Appendix A presents counterfactuals to this benchmark by demonstrating
how the European Union could have fared without the EMU and the euro during the
coming ten years. Here we discuss the likelihood of European monetary unification to
emerge through other routes than that of the Maastricht treaty. In other words, we try to
answer the question: is the euro bound to happen?
2. Challenges for the EMU
2
Since the first plans were announced of the establishment of a single European currency,
its future has been a constant source of forecasts and speculations. In this process,
economists and other commentators have identified a number of challenges, weaknesses or
flaws in the construction of the EMU, as well as proposed policy measures to remedy
these.
3 The methodology of these forecasts is commonly based on two stages, first, one or
several shortcomings are identified, and second, possible remedies are suggested.
4
The vast literature on the future challenges for the EMU can be grouped under four main
headings: (1) the process for fiscal policy-making, (2) the process for monetary policy-
making, (3) the euro area as a non-optimal currency area, and (4) the legitimacy of EMU.
No sharp lines of distinction can be drawn between these groups of arguments as they are
commonly interconnected. For example, the actual conduct of fiscal policies within EMU
will have effects on the design of monetary polices, on the degree of “optimality” of the
euro area, and on the political and popular support behind EMU, that is on the legitimacy
of the common currency.
A number of problems concerning the various transition stages leading up to EMU have
also been identified. These are ignored here as safely belonging to the past. Instead focus is
placed solely on those challenges pertaining to the euro area once it is firmly established
by introduction of the single currency in January 2002– the final stage on the road to the
adoption of the euro. The discussion thus concentrates on the long-run evolution of EMU
and the euro up to year 2010.
(1) Fiscal policy-making. The absence of central co-ordination of fiscal policies within
EMU in combination with the criteria for domestic debt and deficits - as set out in the
Maastricht rules and the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) - is a common source of
objection. According to many economists, this legal framework implies that EMU will not
be able to respond to asymmetric shocks and disturbances in a satisfactory way.
5 Further,
2 The EMU covers all the members of the EU. The euro area or the euro zone presently includes 12 of the 15
EU-member states. United Kingdom, Denmark and Sweden are the ”outs”.
3 The challenges to the EMU have given rise to a flowering field of synonyms like "sources of concern", see
Eichengreen (1997a), "hazard area", "weakness", "potential fault lines", see Obstfeld (1998).
4 Few academic economists paint a rosy picture of the future for EMU. There seems to be a bias of
pessimism concerning the performance of EMU in many of their forecasts.9
the institutional framework may contribute to pro-cyclical fiscal behavior. During booms,
there are no efficient limits to growth of public expenditures and to reductions in taxes. In
recessions, on the other hand, the rules of the SGP force fiscal policy-makers to reduce
government expenditures and raise taxes. In short, the standard textbook recipe for
Keynesian counter-cyclical policy prescription is turned upside down.
6
(2) Monetary policy-making. Several weaknesses in the institutional framework for
monetary policy-making have been pointed out.
(2a) Lender of last resort. The euro area lacks an explicit central lender of last resort. The
ECB has not been granted power by the Maastricht treaty to perform this function. This
stands in contrast with modern central banks, which exercise lender of last resort
responsibilities to guarantee the liquidity and functioning of the payments system.
7 In the
face of a liquidity crisis, the absence of a lender of last resort may weaken the euro.
8
(2b) Financial supervision. The euro area lacks a central authority to supervise the
financial systems, including the commercial banks, of the euro area. The Maastricht treaty
gives the ECB some supervisory functions but they are primarily the task of the member
states. This state of affairs portends that a future pan-European financial crisis may not be
efficiently resolved, consequently undermining the stability of the euro-system.
9
(2c) Division of monetary power. The policy directives for the ECB are said to be
inconsistent and badly designed. Although the ECB is to carry out "domestic" monetary
policy within the euro area according to the Maastricht Treaty, the exchange rate system
for EMU is set by the Council of the European Union, that is by the Council of finance
ministers of the euro area. The ministers can give general orientations to the ECB as well,
which may undermine the credibility of the ECB.
(2d) Accountability and transparency. A common critique against the euro-system and the
ECB states that it lacks accountability and transparency. This critique suggests that the
ECB will not work as efficient as a traditional central bank.
10
3. The euro area as a non-optimal currency area. A common assertion by economists is
that Europe is too heterogeneous a geographical area to form a well-functioning monetary
5 On the effects of the stability pact, see i. a. the contributions in Brunila, Buti and Franco (2001). The
counter-argument states that once EMU is created, private agents will adjust to the new rules of the game and
smooth shocks through channels other than fiscal and monetary policies. See e.g. Mélitz (1997).
6 The counterarguments to this are found e.g. in Barrell and Dury (2001) and Dalsgaard and Serres (2001).
7 This argument is set forth by i.a. Prati and Shinasi (1999).
8 There is no explicit rule for ECB to provide liquidity in the event of a crisis. However, the counterargument
states that ECB can serve as such a provider, if it chooses to do so.
9 See i.a. Prati and Shinasi (1999) and Obstfeld (1998). The counterargument is that various working parties
and committees are studying this issue. Presently, there is a belief that a centralized supervisory authority
would lack the country-specific information needed for successful regulation of financial institutions.
Consequently, the present system is considered adequate, leaving to the euro-member states to be in charge
of domestic financial supervision.
10 Monetary policy issues of the euro area-system are critically assessed by i.a. Begg, et al (1998) and Buiter
(1999). For a counterview, see Issing (1999). See also OECD (1998a). See also Alesina and Wacziarg (1998)
on objections to the institutional framework of the EMU.10
union. In the parlance of economists, the euro area with its present twelve member states is
not an optimal currency area. This point, which dates back from the analysis of optimal
currency areas initiated by Robert Mundell and others in the 1960s, has been debated
continuously since the announcement of the plans for a monetary union in Europe. A
sizeable body of empirical work reaches the conclusion that the euro area can hardly be
looked upon as an optimal monetary union; at least it appears less suitable as a monetary
union than its US counterpart.
11 The efficiency gains from lower transaction costs and
increased trade through the use of one single currency will not outweigh the costs of
surrendering control over national monetary policies.
The costs of giving up national monetary sovereignty depend on many factors: the
incidence of asymmetric or idiosyncratic macroeconomic disturbances across the euro
area, the degree of flexibility of wages and prices, the mobility of factors of production
within the EMU, and the extent to which fiscal policies, either on a national or on a pan-
European level, can serve as a substitute for changes in the exchange rate and the interest
rates of the domestic currency. European labor markets are commonly described as rigid
and labor mobility within the euro zone as limited.
12 Under these circumstances an
asymmetric shock may set off an adjustment process that is slower and costlier within the
euro area than would be the case if national currencies were maintained and the option of
exchange rate adjustments was maintained.
Economists commonly conceive this point as a major objection to EMU. The abolition of
domestic currencies and thus of the possibility to adjust nominal exchange rates and
domestic interest rates reduces the scope of stabilizing the economies of the euro area
when faced with asymmetric or country-specific shocks. However, the point has not been
left uncontested. It is argued that, once formed, a monetary union will influence reaction
patterns among wage earners, firms and trade unions such that shocks in the future will be
met in a more efficient way than otherwise. There are costs of fluctuating exchange rates as
well, in particular for small open economies, in a world of free capital mobility.
4. The political legitimacy of EMU. Several commentators argue that the EMU is lacking
political legitimacy and acceptance: EMU and the institutions surrounding EMU such as
the ECB, the euro and the SGP, are not “embedded” into a broadly accepted political
structure.
13 By tradition, Europeans look upon their nation states as their fundamental
political entity. They identify themselves with the nation state and its symbols such as the
national flag, the anthem and the national currency. To Europeans their nation states form
the basis for their history, for their culture, for their political traditions, in short, for their
identities. The boundaries of the individual nation states are as a rule the boundaries of a
common language. The supra-national and pan-European character of the euro, the single
European currency, may for these reasons meet with doubt among Europeans.
14
11 See for example Eichengreen (1997b).
12 See for example Pissarides (1997) on the consequences of relatively low labor mobility within Europe for
monetary unification.
13 See for example the contributions in Crouch (2000).
14 The Danish no to joining the euro area in the referendum in the fall of 2000 is a witness to the strength of
these political sentiments. A large share of the Danish voters looked upon the euro as a threat to their national
independence and to the welfare state of Denmark.11
Weak political legitimacy may invite political critique against EMU and the euro. It may
emanate from different sources. Should major economic problems, such as high
unemployment, dismal growth and stagnation, arise within a single member or a group of
members of the euro area, populist political movements may be tempted to exploit them to
attack EMU. Facing a negative macroeconomic shock, such as a new oil price rise or a
deep depression, requests for fiscal transfers, for protection and for exemption from the
Maastricht rules and the SGP may undermine the credibility of EMU and the political
cohesion required for a well functioning monetary union. Blaming external “foreign”
decision-makers for domestic problems is a time-honored political reaction pattern. The
incentives for this blame-game will not disappear in the future.
The above list of the most commonly raised objections to EMU inspires us to ask how
important and relevant they will be in the future?
15 To answer this question, the history of
monetary unions concerning these issues is summarized below.
3. Lessons from the history of monetary unions
The stability of the euro-system has been in the center of the theoretical analysis and the
policy debate about EMU and the ECB. For this reason, it is worthwhile to explore the
lessons from the past concerning the conditions crucial to the sustainability of monetary
unions. Ideally, the necessary and sufficient conditions for successful monetary unification
should be distilled from history. However, history can hardly be read as a cookbook
delivering such a recipe. At best it is possible to identify some features in the design of
monetary unions important for their performance. This is the task of this section.
16
A monetary union is commonly defined as a geographical area within which only one type
of currency is circulating, serving as the unit of account, the medium of exchange and the
store of value. The exchange rate is by definition irrevocably fixed within the union. Every
part or member of the union is using the same currency or currencies tied to each other at
truly fixed rates. Towards the rest of the world the monetary union has one exchange rate
for converting outside currencies into the domestic money.
The 19
th and 20
th centuries saw high degrees of creation and destruction of monetary
unions, primarily as a result of far-reaching political changes. When analyzing the record
of monetary unions during the past 200 years - their creation, performance, sustainability
and decline - it is fruitful to distinguish between two types of monetary unions: those based
on one single monetary authority, commonly a central bank, and those based on
cooperation among many monetary authorities or central banks.
17 The first type can also be
classified as a centralized monetary union, the other type as a decentralized monetary
union.
15 The list of challenges to EMU can be made longer. See for example Calomiris (1999) and Dornbusch
(1996).
16 This section builds primarily upon Bordo and Jonung (1997, 1999). The history of monetary unions in
Europe is dealt with in several contributions. See for example Theurl (1992) and Vanthoor (1996).
17 Many central banks were private or semi-private institutions in the 19
th century. In the 20
th century they
were commonly nationalized. The conclusions in this section hold regardless of the ownership of the
monetary authority.12
The political state, the nation state, is as a rule organized as a centralized monetary union
where the political and monetary borders coincide. The United States, as one example, is
divided into a number of Federal Reserve districts, each district headed by a Federal
Reserve Bank issuing dollar denominated notes. These notes are always interchangeable
with each other at a fixed exchange rate. The Scandinavian monetary union - founded in
the 1870’s and lasting into the 1920’s - encompassing three nation states, Denmark,
Norway and Sweden, is an example of a decentralized monetary union. Together the three
countries formed a union but each retained a central bank that issued notes denominated in
Scandinavian kronor. The notes traded prior to 1914 at par. Here the monetary union
lacked a central monetary authority – which eventually proved to be a fatal flaw.
18
The reason why it is important to distinguish between these two types of institutional
frameworks is that the sustainability of a monetary union is crucially dependent on how it
is constructed from the outset. History demonstrates that centralized monetary unions are
as a rule durable and permanent ones, more precisely, they are better able to adjust to and
survive shocks and disturbances than are decentralized unions, which have a stronger
tendency to break up under economic and political turmoil.
This conclusion is based on a comparison between centralized monetary unions of
countries such as the United States, Germany and Italy and decentralized monetary unions
like the Austro-German monetary union, the Scandinavian monetary union and the Latin
monetary union. The latter three lacked a central authority for coordinating monetary
policies across the members of the monetary area. When subjected to major shocks, the
lack of a coordination mechanism eventually brought each union to an end.
Sovereign states may join a centralized monetary union as well. Examples are the CFA
Franc Zone and the East Caribbean Currency Area (ECCA) or the long-lasting monetary
union between Belgium and Luxembourg. The recent adoption of the dollar as the
domestic currency in countries like Equador and El Salvador represents an exchange rate
arrangement that should be classified as a centralized monetary union (see Table 1). As a
rule, small economies tend to adopt the currency of the monetary power closest by, see for
example the case of Andorra and Monaco.
Commonly in history, monetary unification has been a consequence of political
unification.
19 Once political unity is established through the creation of an independent
state, a process of monetary unification is initiated. Monetary unity can come about
through different routes. One route is through the existence of one dominant member, a
hegemon, pushing for political and thus monetary unification. In case the hegemon loses
its position of power relative to the other members of the union, the union runs the risk of
falling apart. This was the case for example with the Russian and Austro-Hungarian
empires after World War I and with the Soviet Union in the 1990s. In a similar way the de-
colonization process in the 1950s and 1960s brought about the break-up of monetary
unions based on the currency of the colonial power. The hegemon can use either sanctions,
for example threat of military intervention, or subsidies and other forms of side-payments
to maintain political and monetary cooperation.
Monetary unity can also be established and maintained through shared values concerning
the benefits of cooperation among sovereign member states. These values can be traced
18 See the description in Jonung (2002).
19 Another force was a will to standardize coinage and notes in circulation. It explains much of the monetary
unification among German states in the early part of the 19
th century.13
back to common religious, cultural, and historical factors, closeness in language and in
geography. The creation of the Scandinavian monetary union is an example of such a
union during the 19
th century. The EMU is the prime case of such a process of monetary
unification in modern times.
20
Monetary union creation and separation may take a long time in itself; witness for example
the gradual rise of the US monetary union or the Italian monetary union.
21 As political
unity is commonly the glue that holds a monetary union together, the disappearance of
political unity has as a rule spelt the end of monetary unity. The break-up of states like
Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia in the 1990s illustrates this point. However, there are cases
where a monetary union has survived political break-ups. The Scandinavian monetary
union, for example, was maintained after Norway declared itself completely independent
from Sweden in 1905. Ireland too continued on the British pound standard after its
independence in 1922 until joining the ERM.
Does monetary unification require fiscal unification as well? To answer this question, let
us classify monetary unions according to their degree of fiscal unification. Two major
types of fiscal unions may be discerned; those based on centralized fiscal systems and
those based on federal (decentralized) systems, bearing in mind that there is no sharp line
of demarcation between the two systems. See Table 1 for a stylized picture.
In the traditional European nation state, commonly with a parliamentary system, monetary
and fiscal policies are centrally determined, see region I in Table 1. However, monetary
unification can exist with fiscal decentralization, see region II in Table 1. In federal states,
like the US, Germany, Canada and Switzerland, monetary policy-making is centrally
coordinated – often through a central bank with a federal structure - while fiscal powers are
decentralized to varying extents.
A group of politically independent countries may form a monetary union with minor or no
coordination of fiscal policies. The ECB-system is constructed as a centralized monetary
authority while fiscal policy-making remains basically in the hands of the individual
member states of the euro area within the rules set out in the Maastricht treaty and the
SGP.
22 Dollarized countries are the extreme example of centralized monetary policy-
making and no fiscal coordination at all.
The pattern in Table 1 indicates that it has been easier to surrender monetary sovereignty
than fiscal sovereignty to a central authority.
23 Fiscal federalism has commonly been a
method of gaining acceptance for unifying politically regions with different religions,
cultures, ethnic backgrounds and histories. Still, some federations have not been able to
survive as federal states. In these cases, monetary dissolution has commonly also been the
result of political dissolution.
20 See Cohen (2000) for a discussion of the influence of political factors on the sustainability of monetary
unions.
21 On the length of the US monetary unification process, see Rockoff (2000).
22 Monetary and fiscal policies are interconnected through the intertemporal budget constraint of the fiscal
authorities. The rules of the ECB are designed to cut this link between fiscal and monetary policies by
prohibiting the ECB-system from purchasing domestic government debt instruments.
23 See for example Capie (1998).14
History suggests – as summarized in Table 1 - that decentralized fiscal systems are
compatible with successful monetary unification as long as the monetary union has been
organized as a centralized one, i.e., as long as one decision-maker has controlled the
money supply. In this case, by definition, different fiscal jurisdictions do not have direct
access to money supply creation.
24
To sum up, the record on monetary unification points at several conclusions concerning the
sustainability of monetary unions. The following are probably the most important ones for
analyzing the long-run evolution of EMU:
(1) History suggests that successful and lasting monetary unification is as a rule based on
political unification. Political unity can be founded on either the existence of one dominant
country that is able to superimpose its monetary system on others, or on a shared feeling of
the benefits of cooperation manifested in a system of institutional linkages. This is the glue
that holds a monetary union together. The desire to create a political unit like the nation
state has been the dominating driving force behind monetary unification in the past.
(2) History suggests that centralized monetary unions are permanent institutions compared
to decentralized monetary unions - or at least more durable - as well as compared to all
other forms of fixed exchange rate arrangements.
(3) History suggests that the degree of fiscal federalism is not a prime determinant of the
longevity of monetary unions. Monetary unification does not require fiscal unification as
long as the money supply is centrally controlled. If the system determining taxes and
expenditures across regions within a nation or group of states/regions is designed to
facilitate and maintain political unity, this will enhance monetary unity as well.
25
(4) History suggests that monetary unions and monetary institutions evolve gradually over
time in response to exogenous events. Seen in a long-run perspective, they are flexible and
adaptable arrangements.
(5) Regardless of the choice of exchange rate arrangement – fixed or floating exchange
rates - the economy of any country or group of countries has been the subject of negative
macroeconomic disturbances, business cycle downturns and crises in the past. There is no
foolproof or fail-safe monetary arrangement that guarantees a shock-free future. Thus, any
type of monetary union will sooner or later run into hard times that will test the endurance
of the union.
4. What does history tell us about the sustainability of the EMU?
When forecasting the future of EMU, the first and most important issue to decide is
whether EMU will function as a centralized or a decentralized union. As pointed out
initially, in a historical perspective the ECB-system is a unique enterprise where politically
24 The Soviet Union in the 1990s is a case where members of the ruble zone could borrow from the central
bank in Moscow to finance budget deficits. This situation led to excessive money creation and eventually to
very rapid inflation. As a consequence, several members left the ruble zone. See e.g. Bornefalk (1998).
25 Fiscal decentralization may thus be a method of maintaining a monetary union. This is the case for
example in Canada and Switzerland.15
independent countries surrender their monetary sovereignty to a common central bank
while maintaining fiscal independence within the framework of their EU-memberships.
Although EMU is a construction without precedence, much suggests that it will function as
a centralized monetary union. The main reason is that monetary policy-making is carried
out by one institution, the ECB, having the monopoly power of issuing the base money, the
euro. The structure of the ECB-system is that of a centralized monetary union.
Membership in EMU is permanent too. There is no escape clause giving the members the
r i g h tt oa no r d e r l ye x i t .
This conclusion is the central one when considering the four standard challenges for EMU
using the history of monetary unions as our guide. Our reasoning below is thus contingent
upon EMU functioning as a centralized union.
(1) Fiscal policy-making. Most commentators agree that the coordination of fiscal policies
in the euro area is crucial for the evolution of EMU. Presently the institutional framework
for fiscal policy-making is emerging. This process will continue during the coming decade
as well. At a first glance, this evolutionary approach may appear as sign of weakness.
However, much suggests it is rather a sign of strength. Policy-making and institution-
building is a trial-and-error process. Basically, the euro-group is involved in a learning
process.
26 As long as the process is evolving in response to changing circumstances and
challenges, influenced by critique and recommendations from the inside as well as the
outside, this improves the sustainability outlook for EMU.
At this point in time neither policy-makers nor academic economists know to what extent
fiscal policies should be coordinated across the euro area. Actually, fiscal decentralization
may be a suitable way to counter negative effects of the monetary centralization brought
about by the EMU. The present criteria for debts and deficits may prove to be too strict or
too lax - only time will tell.
From a historical perspective, centralized monetary unions like the EMU can exist with
many types of fiscal systems, as suggested by Table 1. A necessary condition for viability
is that national fiscal authorities do not have access to national central banks with the right
t oi s s u eb a s em o n e y .
(2) Monetary policy-making. Several weaknesses in the monetary policy-making process
within the euro area were identified above. These challenges will be met by an ongoing
learning-process similar to the case of fiscal policy-making. Actually, it will be easier to
deal with the challenges for monetary policy as the experience of traditional central
banking can be used as a guide for the ECB-system. It is more difficult to forecast the
evolution of the fiscal policy process for the euro area as there is no clear precedence for
such an international cooperation among many national ministries of finance.
26 Several studies within political science, often under the rubric of ”social learning”, examine how policy-
makers learn. See for example Bennet and Howlett (1992) and Hall (1993). Recently economists have
studied economic policy-making as a learning process. Oliver (1997) deals with British monetary and fiscal
policies and Jonung (2001) with the Swedish record. Policy learning implies a process where the decision-
makers change their preferences. The standard approach in economics, however, is to assume constant
preferences. This is one reason why economists have been less inclined to apply a learning perspective to the
conduct of economic policies.16
(3) EMU as a non-optimal currency area. History demonstrates that the predictive power
of the theories of optimal currency area is extremely weak.
27 In short, monetary unions are
not created or dissolved according to this approach. The establishment of EMU and the
euro is due to decisions based on the desire to expand and deepen European integration.
The weakness of the optimal currency area approach is found in its lack of political and
historical dimensions, ignoring the path dependence that follows from political integration,
more specifically from the existence of national borders. In theory, the optimal monetary
area can be redrawn continuously without regard to existing national borders. Such
borders, however, are permanent institutions that remain unchanged for long periods. For
many countries their borders have been permanent for centuries.
The optimal currency area theories stand out as too narrowly formulated in economic terms
to be useful for forecasting the future of EMU.
28 Besides, the euro area is likely to move
closer to an “optimal” monetary union over time as expectations, behavior and institutions
change as a result of the introduction of the euro in January 2002.
29 The common currency,
now circulating freely, increases the viability of the union as the memory of national
currencies fades away.
(4) The political legitimacy of EMU. History shows that political unity holds a monetary
union together, either through the existence of one dominant member or through a
commonly shared view of the benefits of monetary cooperation. This suggests that the
most important factor behind the sustainability of EMU is the opinion held by all the
members or at least the major members of EU that the benefits of the euro in broad
political and economic terms exceed the costs. The major challenge in the coming years for
EMU is to maintain the political backing behind and thus the legitimacy of the EMU-
project across the euro area. A sharp fall in the legitimacy of the common currency may
threaten its existence. Thus, a forecast of the future of EMU should start from a forecast of
the political landscape of Europe in year 2010.
The political and economic unification of Europe has continued since the treaty of Rome –
albeit at varying speeds. At this point of time, the consensus among the present twelve
members of the EMU appears to be strong concerning the benefits of the common
currency. Actually, the euro represents one of the most notable achievements – perhaps the
most notable – of the European Union. The EMU-project has been carried through a
number of critical stages and crises. Considerable political capital has been invested into
the project. The introduction of the euro in January 2002 gave additional credibility to the
EMU-project. It passed something of a point of no return with the disappearance of the
national currencies within the euro area. The intrastate cooperation among the members of
EU has by now created a close network of ties among its members, where EMU is a most
important part of this system of interlocking institutions.
To conclude, judging from history, EMU will most likely find solutions to the “traditional”
challenges discussed above during its first ten years. It will exist as long as there is a
common political wish within EU to maintain monetary unity. Of course, EMU will be
subject to negative economic shocks – which will have political consequences. But as long
27 This conclusion is well supported in the literature. See for example Cesarano (1997), Cohen (1998, 2000)
and Goodhart (1995).
28 Still, the theory identifies a number of adjustment problems within a monetary union.
29 On this point see for exampel Frankel and Rose (1997).17
as the political acceptance and support exists, the EMU will adjust and adapt to changing
circumstances.
5. What does history tell us about the price stabilisation of the EMU?
The historical evidence strongly suggests that the newly established EMU will endure as a
monetary union by being a centralized monetary union with the necessary political
legitimacy. Given that it will survive as an institution, the question then arises: Will EMU
deliver the monetary and fiscal stability as set out in the treaties and instructions
surrounding the euro during the coming decade? To survive is one thing – to live up to its
promise of creating macroeconomic stability in Europe is another and – much suggests -
more challenging task.
Monetary and fiscal stability in the context of EMU can be defined as achieving three
goals simultaneously: first, price stability, broadly interpreted as a rate of inflation in the
medium term that does not surpass two percent per year; second, a public debt to GDP
ratio of less than 60 per cent, and third, budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus
over the medium term. By fulfilling these requirements, EMU-members should avoid
breaching the three per cent central government budget deficit ceiling during economic
downturns. These goals pertain to normal circumstances. Under exceptional circumstances
the general government deficit is allowed to exceed the three-percent limit. There is thus
an escape clause in the rules.
5.1 Monetary and fiscal stability in the euro area in the past
One way to answer the question about the future macroeconomic stability within the euro
area is to examine the macroeconomic record of the euro-members in a historical
perspective. It is displayed in three charts: Chart 1 shows the rate of inflation, Chart 2
public debt to GDP, and Chart 3 the central government budget deficit as a percentage of
national income.
30 All charts cover the period 1880-2000. They are based on averages for
the Euro-5 area, i.e. for Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands, where data
is available.
31
The macroeconomic record is also summarized in Table 2 showing descriptive statistics for
these three variables: their mean and standard deviation. The standard deviation is a simple
measure of convergence among the members of the Euro-5 area. The period is classified
according to the following chronology of monetary regimes in Europe: the classical gold
standard (1880-1913), World War I (1914-1919), the interwar period (1920-38), World
War II (1939-46), the Bretton Woods period (1947-1971), the snake and EMS-period
(1972-1995), and finally, the run-up to EMU (1996-2000).
30 Charts 2 and 3 as well as Table 2 refer to central government expenditures. However, the Maastricht Treaty
and the SGP refer to general government expenditures, which include central government (i.e. state budget),
local government (municipalities and other lower levels of the government) and social security funds. Thus,
these measure of fiscal stability used above is not identical to the measure set out in the EMU-legislation.
However, lack of data forces us to use central government expenditures as a proxy for general government
expenditures.
31 Data for Charts 1-3 and Table 2 are taken from Bordo and Jonung (2001).18
The evidence displayed in Charts 1-3 and Table 2 makes it possible to carry out two types
of comparisons. First, past monetary and fiscal performance in the Euro-5 area can be
studied using the goals of EMU and the ECB as they are benchmarked in Charts 1-3.
Second, comparisons can be made across different regimes.
The classical gold standard was associated with a low and stable long-run rate of inflation.
During the gold standard the debt to GDP ratio fell from the mid 1890’s, reaching a level
below 60 per cent in the decade prior to the outbreak of World War I. The budget deficit as
a percentage of GDP fluctuated around the zero level from the early 1890s and up to World
War I. (See Charts 1-3).
Charts 1-3 and Table 2 demonstrate that during the classical gold standard the Euro-5
countries maintained monetary and fiscal stability as presently defined for them by the
EMU-system. However, when looking at the record, it should be borne in mind that the
notion of using fiscal policy as a tool for stabilizing the domestic economy hardly existed
prior to the depression of the 1930s. During the gold standard the guiding rule for
monetary policy was the maintenance of the convertibility of the domestic money into gold
at a fixed price. The major monetary instrument was the discount rate of the central bank.
Other policy objectives were secondary to this rule or were not on the policy agenda at all,
like the goal of full employment or high economic growth. In short, fiscal policy was
subordinated to the goal of maintaining a fixed gold price. Actually, the members of the
Euro-5 group formed a monetary union by adhering to the classical gold standard.
32 33
World War I brought about extreme monetary and fiscal instability as measured by the
EMU-criteria. The rules of the gold standard were abandoned. An unprecedented rapid rise
in government expenditures and thus in budget deficits among the belligerents – see Charts
2 and 3 - forced governments to turn to their central banks for borrowing. Monetary policy
became subordinated to the financing of the war effort as debt was monetized. The volume
of base money and the money supply increased rapidly. As a consequence, the rate of
inflation accelerated, reaching levels far above those of the classical gold standard - see
Table 2. (Due to large fluctuations in the price level, the rate of inflation is not displayed in
Chart 1 for the period 1914-49).
The interwar period was also characterized by monetary and fiscal instability, primarily
due to the monetary and fiscal imbalances created by World War I. Europe was not able to
return to the macroeconomic stability associated with the prewar gold standard. The
interwar years became a period of several monetary regimes with high and persistent
unemployment and considerable swings in the price level. The depression of the 1930s
caused the dissolution of the gold standard. Europe ended up in an autarchic phase during
the 1930s with far-reaching restrictions on the flow of trade and of capital across borders.
32 Italy did not maintain gold parity during the whole period studied here as it had major budgetary problems.
See Fratianni and Spinelli (2000).
33 The differences and similarities between EMU and the classical gold standard in Europe are considered is
several contributions; see for example Eichengreen (1996) and Flandreau, Cacheux and Zumer (1998). See
also Bordo (1999) on the lessons from the classical gold standard.19
From a monetary and fiscal point of view, World War II was a re-run of World War I when
huge budget deficits were financed by monetary expansion and followed by high inflation.
The patterns for the two world wars are almost identical in the sense that fiscal policies
determined the money supply process and thus the price level.
The Bretton Woods system, established after World War II, represented in major ways a
return to a gold standard system as the US dollar was tied to gold at a fixed rate and the
rest of the industrial world tied their currencies to the dollar. However, the free flow of
capital across the borders of Europe was suppressed by exchange controls to lend short-run
autonomy for national policies. The monetary and fiscal record of the Euro-5 area during
the Bretton Woods period in the1950s and 1960s resembles that of the classical gold
standard. The rate of inflation - with the exception for the Korean inflation boom - was
comparatively low, public debt was amortized and fell as a ratio of GDP, and central
government budgets were kept in rough balance. See Charts 1-3 and Table 2.
Expansionary fiscal and monetary policies in the US as well as in Europe undermined the
Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates. After its breakdown in the early 1970s and
following the OPEC I and OPEC II energy price increases, the Euro-5 members used
expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to maintain full employment and to counteract
the terms of trade shock caused by the rise in oil prices. Budget deficits increased (Chart
3), the public debt to GDP ratio started to rise in the early 1970s (Chart 2), and the rate of
inflation (Chart 1) peaked at double-digit levels in the 1970s. Exchange rate alignments
within Europe became frequent. As capital movements were liberalized in Western
Europe, a return to the pegged exchange rate system of the Bretton Woods was made
difficult.
Inflation rates and budget deficits were reduced in the 1980s as the Euro-5 members
moved towards the German stability model when framing macroeconomic policies. This
process of convergence was temporarily brought to a halt during the ERM-crises of 1992-
93. After the crises, starting in the mid 1990s, convergence continued; inflation rates were
reduced, budget deficits were brought down and the debt to GDP-ratio fell below the 60
per cent level. Entering the 21
st century, the Euro-5 members fulfilled the three criteria of
monetary and fiscal stability anew. Convergence as measured by the standard deviation of
the inflation rates in Table 2 is larger than during any other monetary regime. Now the
question arises: for how long will the euro area members be able to maintain the monetary
and fiscal stability they have reached today?20
5.2. Conventional challenges to price stabilization
Scanning across the monetary regimes prevailing in the Euro-5 area during the 20
th
century, two conclusions emerge concerning the achievement of monetary and fiscal
stability for EMU. First of all, two periods of stability can be discerned: the classical gold
standard and the Bretton Woods period after the Korea boom. These regimes maintained
stability because, first, monetary policy was bound by the rule of convertibility of the
domestic currency at a fixed rate into gold or dollar, and, second, fiscal policy was
subordinated to monetary policy.
Secondly, monetary and fiscal stability was destroyed due to disturbances, which gave rise
to rapid growth in government expenditures, causing budget deficits being financed by
debt expansion and money supply creation. The past identifies two such disturbances: the
outbreak of war in 1914 and in 1939, and, during peace time conditions, the terms of trade
shocks in the 1970s when full employment was the prime goal of monetary and fiscal
policies.
The record of the past thus suggests that a necessary condition for future monetary and
fiscal stability within EMU is that the policy-makers of EMU follow macroeconomic
policy rules similar to those that prevailed during the gold standard and the dollar-gold
standard. This task may be more difficult today than in the past when gold served as the
nominal anchor for European monetary and fiscal policies. In the absence of a metallic
standard, the ECB has constructed a nominal anchor for monetary policy under a paper
standard in the form of an inflation target in the range between zero and two per cent
annual rate of inflation.
It is reasonable to conclude that the introduction of EMU and the euro represents a return
to a modified gold standard regime in Europe as the core of its rules are now replicated by
the EMU.
34 However, the favorable macroeconomic conditions that allowed the gold
standard to produce stability for several decades prior to 1914 may not be at hand. History
suggests a number of possible disturbances to the European economies that would
challenge the goal of price stability in the future – just as they undermined the gold
standard. Let us briefly consider them.
Fiscal shocks. The EMU-system is designed to let monetary policy dominate fiscal policies
in order to guarantee the credibility and sustainability of the goal of price stability. Any
major economic disturbance in the coming ten years that expands budget deficits would
pose a risk to price stability. Such a negative shock would reduce the incentives of the
members of the euro area to support the goal of price stability by a policy of fiscal
prudence. Requests for the financing of budget deficits within the euro area by money
creation will be raised. Such requests are commonly met during wartime conditions as seen
from Charts 1-3 and Table 1. War has been the mother of inflation in Europe – as
everywhere else.
The risk of a war among the members of the EMU can safely be ruled out for many
reasons, not least for empirical ones. There is no case in history where full-fledged
democracies have entered into war with each other – and all members of EMU are
democracies. European economic and political integration is fashioned to reduce the risk of
34 This conclusion is developed in Bordo and Jonung (2001).21
warlike tensions in Europe again. The creation of a common currency in Europe is actually
the result of a long process inspired by the upheaval of World War I and II in Europe.
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Under peacetime conditions, there is only one occasion of a shock causing a long-term rise
in prices in the euro area: the terms of trade shocks (OPEC I and II) in the 1970’s,
following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system. The response in many European
countries was to counteract the negative effects of the rise in energy prices by deficit
financing. Monetary and fiscal policies stimulated aggregate demand to maintain
employment, contributing to inflationary pressure.
Terms of trade shocks similar to OPEC I and II may occur again – but the policy response
in EMU is likely to be different from the reaction in the 1970s for several reasons. First,
the lessons of OPEC I and II are fairly uncontroversial by now. Supply side shocks like
sharp oil price rises are not successfully met by expansionary demand policies. The goal of
price stability dominates presently over the goal full employment as well. EMU will
maintain a flexible exchange rate towards the outside world, which would facilitate the
adjustment to terms of trade shocks. European financial markets are more developed today
than in the 1970s, which would make the adjustment process easier than in the 1970s, thus
reducing political demands for expansionary measures. Most importantly, the large size of
the euro area – and it will expand further through the enlargement process - makes EMU
less vulnerable to terms of trade shocks than was the case for any single European country
in the 1970s.
Other shocks. Macroeconomic disturbances other than wars and terms of trade shocks may
hit the EMU-area in the coming decade. The European economies have been subject to
financial crises since at least the 17
th century. The ERM-project was severely damaged by
a set of currency and banking crises in the early 1990s within Europe. Financial crises will
occur in the future as well, the risk being largest in EU-countries, which have recently
liberalized their financial systems.
Most of the severe financial crises of the past have been closely related to exchange rate
crises. Domestic banking crises have often been aggravated by currency speculation. The
creation of EMU and the introduction of the common currency probably reduce the
incidence and impact of financial crises in Europe as the exchange rate risk is eliminated as
a driving force behind financial crises. The introduction of the euro also contributes to the
integration and development of financial markets within the euro area, making it easier to
solve financial crises through market solutions across borders, for example through “good”
banks acquiring “bad” banks, assuming that “good” banks originate in EMU-members with
well-developed financial markets.
As a rule, financial crises per se have not been the cause of inflation in European history.
Financial crises tend to occur during periods of falling rates of inflation, not during
inflation. True, deep financial crises – like in Finland and Sweden in the early 1990s -
threatening the entire financial system with bankruptcy put heavy stress on the fiscal
position of the government as the ministry of finance – not the central bank – serves as a
lender of last resort under such extreme circumstances.
36
35 For an opposite view, see Feldstein (1997) who argues that the design of EMU may entice war-like
conflicts among its members in the future.
36 The pattern of economic crisis worldwide is surveyed in Bordo et al (2001).22
In the future, the euro area just like any national monetary union will be hit continuously
by various shocks. These disturbances may be a threat to price stability in the short run.
Still, long run price stability can be maintained in the face of temporary shocks to the price
level, given that the public believes that policy-makers will revert to lower rates of
inflation in the future.
37 As long as the EMU-regime remains credible, policy-makers may
allow deviations from price stability in the short run. The inflation shock – the original
impulse - during the Korea boom demonstrates this point – see Chart 1. This rise in price
level in 1950 did not initiate a process of continuous inflation in the subsequent years.
To sum up, in the past the European economy has been the subject of a large number of
macroeconomic disturbances. In the future EMU will be hit by symmetric as well as
asymmetric shocks. As long as these shocks do not give rise to large budget deficits
financed by money creation, they will not per se pose a threat to medium and long run
price stability in the euro area. A major challenge for the EMU-system is thus to minimize
the risk of a fiscal shocks. In a historical perspective this risk is the Achilles’ heel of price
stability.
5.3. Non-conventional challenges to price stabilisation
So far we have considered the impact of inflationary shocks on the ECB goal of price
stability while assuming that the policy preferences of the ECB remain constant. Such
disturbances can be regarded as conventional or traditional challenges for EMU. Next, we
contemplate a number of non-conventional challenges to price stability in the euro area
related to the policy paradigm underlying the EMU-system. They may arise even if the
ECB manages to maintain price stability in Europe for the whole period leading up to year
2010.
As the risk of a change in the ECB policy paradigm presently appears remote, the
following discussion may emerge as highly speculative and unrealistic. However, in a long
run perspective, the policy preferences and thus the behavior of central banks do change.
At least two major reversals in central banking preferences, and thus in central banking
behavior, occurred worldwide in the 20
th century. There are no guarantees that this will not
happen again in 21
st century. Thus, we are of the opinion that unconventional challenges to
price stability deserve to be taken seriously – although they may seem of little interest
presently. To understand the processes determining the policy preferences of monetary and
fiscal authorities, it is necessary to revert briefly to the history of stabilisation policies in
the past century.
The rise of the policy paradigm behind the EMU
The conduct and design of monetary and fiscal policies in a country is based on the
prevailing policy paradigm or policy model.
38 This model encompasses several
37 The classical gold standard functioned as a commitment technology. Credible policy-makers could leave
the gold standard temporarily and return to it again after an inflationary burst without a rise in long-term
inflationary expectations – given that the breaking of the rules was regarded as a temporary step due to
extreme circumstances like a war. See Bordo and Kydland (1999).
38 See Pekkarinen (1989) who makes a distinction between the “policy model” and the “theory model” – the
policy model is held by decision-makers (ministers of finance and central bankers) in charge of the framing
stabilisation policies. The theory model is the dominating “mainstream” model held among academic
economists.23
dimensions: most importantly, the choice of goals, the choice of monetary and fiscal
instruments, and the legal framework concerning the institutions for policy-making. The
macroeconomic theory or philosophy underlying the policy paradigm ultimately
determines these dimensions of the policy paradigm. Commonly, ideological aspects are
tied to the underlying policy paradigm.
Two basic macroeconomic policy paradigms have prevailed in the post World War II
period in Europe. In the 1960s and 1970s, the Keynesian paradigm held a strong position,
in particular in Northern Europe.
39 The major goal of stabilization policies was full
employment and high growth. Behind the walls created by exchange controls, the arsenal
of policy instruments was large. It included investment regulations, price controls, taxes
and expenditures and various selective instruments as well as exchange rate re-alignments -
predominantly devaluations. Governments controlled central banks so that monetary policy
was subordinated to fiscal policy. Optimism was strong about the potency of stabilization
policy, in particular about fiscal measures. Governments could and should stabilize the
domestic economy and the business cycle using all available instruments, preferably by a
strategy of “fine tuning”. The approach had a strong interventionist flavor. Governments
should intervene actively to make the economy function properly in all policy fields. The
macroeconomic record of the 1950s and 1960s with high growth and full employment was
taken as evidence of the success of the Keynesian approach.
This (normative) model of the conduct of stabilization policies was based on the (positive)
Keynesian macroeconomic theory that dominated teaching and research in economics at
universities in most of the world. The theoretical model held by the economics profession
was thus similar to that held by policy-makers – a state of affairs that facilitated the
adoption and acceptance of the Keynesian approach. International organizations like the
OECD spread the Keynesian policy view in analyses and prescriptions in the 1960s and
1970s.
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Several factors undermined the Keynesian policy paradigm in the 1970s and 1980s and
replaced it by a new model for stabilization policy-making. First of all, the economics
profession moved away from Keynesian macroeconomics. As a result of work on adaptive
and rational expectations, on monetarism, time inconsistency, credibility etc., the field of
macroeconomics was transformed in the 1970s and 1980s. Economists, rejecting the
Phillips curve view that employment could be permanently increased by expansionary
policies and questioning the efficacy of discretionary short-run monetary and fiscal
policies, stressed the benefits of low and stable inflation through a rule-bound
macroeconomic policy framed for the medium and long run. The new advice suggested the
establishment of central banks independent of the executive power, with clearly defined
and announced goals. The goal of monetary policy should preferably be that of low
inflation, commonly described as price stability. In several countries in the 1990s, inflation
targeting was introduced as the proper strategy of central banks.
Secondly, the 1970s and 1980s were decades of macroeconomic turbulence in Europe:
high and volatile inflation, frequent exchange rate re-alignments, rising government
deficits and debts, dismal growth performance and high unemployment. This performance
was associated with the Keynesian approach. It appeared incapable of finding successful
solutions to these economic challenges. Rather, it was blamed for them. Its legitimacy was
39 See for example the surveys in Boltho (1984) and Hall (1993).
40 See for example the Heller report, Heller et al (1968).24
undermined and the search for alternatives was initiated by policy-makers and by academic
economists.
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Third, against this background, the German stability approach to monetary and fiscal
policy-making with a comparatively independent central bank focusing on low inflation
appeared attractive within the European Union. Germany was the leading economic and
political power in the EU as well. In short, Germany became the “macroeconomic leader”
in Europe: its model for policy-making became gradually accepted as the proper model
among all EU members – the acceptance was slower in countries like the UK and Sweden
where the Keynesian heritage was strong.
42 The rules of the treaties of Maastricht and
Amsterdam defined the institutions and legal framework to ensure the enforcement of the
stability view.
The creation of EMU, the ECB and the institutional framework surrounding the euro is the
result of a unique coincidence of different factors. First, the views and preferences of
policy-makers (both of central bankers and ministers of finance) across the EU converged
into a commonly shared policy paradigm.
43 Second, the views of the macroeconomic
profession converged across countries into an almost identical approach to macroeconomic
theory and policy. Third and finally, the models of the policy-makers and of the academic
profession coincided, facilitating the adoption and acceptance of the EMU, the ECB and
the euro among the members of the EU.
To sum up, the Keynesian orthodoxy was eventually replaced by a new one, presently
enshrined in the institutional framework for monetary and fiscal policy-making in the euro
area. Now the question emerges: for how long will the present macroeconomic paradigm
reign and thus the intellectual unity behind EMU last?
44 Will it be replaced in the coming
decade in a new policy switch similar to the fall in the late 19
th century of the Keynesian
paradigm and the rise of the rule-bound stability view?
Challenges to the policy paradigm of the EMU
There is no generally accepted economic theory for changes (reversals or switches) in
economic policies. Instead, we are forced to generalize from political and economic
history. Policy switches are determined by a combination of factors; the most important
being a perceived failure of the prevailing policy paradigm, the availability of an
alternative approach, the presence of exceptional policy-makers (the role of personalities)
and political circumstances, commonly elections.
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41 See for example Maes (1996, 2000) and Gros and Thygesen (1997).
42 The Keynesian approach did not get as strong a hold in Germany as in many other European countries. See
Hall (1993) for an explanation of this pattern.
43 This was not a major problem in the creation of monetary unions in the past as these unions were based on
currency convertibility into gold. Under such circumstances, it was easier politically to form monetary unions
than today with the absence of a nominal anchor like gold.
44 Of course, we do not find complete unity behind the EMU-project among policy-makers and economists.
Rather, we should talk about relative unity in the sense that there is no major single alternative to EMU
proposed for the moment by influential groups.
45 Theories of policy switches are surveyed in Boltho (1994), Hood (1994), and Jonung (2001). See also
OECD (1998b) for a set of case studies of policy switches.25
The record suggests that the basic requisite for a policy switch is a macroeconomic crisis
of an acute character or developing over a long period of time - which creates a “window
of opportunity”, an opportunity for a re-evaluation of the goals, instruments and
institutions for stabilization policy-framing. The crisis puts the old policy paradigm into
question. It may appear as a failure, inadequate, even viewed as the cause of the crisis. The
demand for a new model increases among policy-makers and the public. The likelihood of
a policy change is greater where an alternative policy paradigm exists and is advocated by
leading economists, politicians and public commentators.
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History demonstrates a number of policy switches away from price stability as the goal of
central banking.
47 In short, they arise when goals other than price stability appear more
attractive to voters and politicians and thus to policy-makers. In the past, the goals of full
employment, of growth and of fixed exchange rates have proven to be strong
competitors/alternatives to the goal of price stability, the present goal of the ECB and the
EMU. In the future they will be challengers as well. Let us briefly consider them below.
i. Unemployment and depression
Price stability achieved by tying the domestic money to gold at a fixed price was the prime
goal of monetary policy prior to the 1930s. The depression of that decade made
unemployment the burning social issue and consequently the prime goal of monetary and
fiscal policy. The eventual result was the demise of the classical approach to central
banking and the rise of the Keynesian policy view. The inflation following the breakdown
of the Bretton Woods system in the 1970s paved the way for the renaissance of the
classical, now dressed as the neo-classical, view. After half a century the pendulum has
swung back to the concepts of the pre-Keynesian era while the memory of the high
unemployment of the 1930s has faded away.
The pendulum may again swing back from price stability to full employment in the future.
Such a move is conceivable if Europe is hit by a major depression combined with a sharp
rise in unemployment in the coming decade. In 1933 the unemployment rate in Germany,
Belgium and the Netherlands – as an average for the three countries – reached a level of 25
percent.
48 Suppose – for reasons unknown - the rate of unemployment in Europe reverts to
such levels in the coming decade while the ECB at the same time maintains a rate of
inflation below its maximum level of 2 per cent per year. Such a macroeconomic outcome
would likely cause a social unrest similar to that of the Great Depression.
Under these circumstances, pro-Keynesian interpretations will quickly gain support and
acceptance within the academic profession. Economists and commentators in the financial
press will recommend prescriptions that run counter to the present EMU policy-paradigm.
Their advice will be exploited by political parties and interest groups and will influence the
views of both the European Parliament and the European Commission. Political parties
46 The switch to an alternative policy paradigm is not in itself a guarantee of a better stabilisation policy
paradigm. History reveals episodes of policy switches producing dismal outcomes.
47 Sweden was the first (and so far the only) country to introduce and try officially a monetary program of
price level targeting. The Swedish experience suggests a number of threats to price stability: most
prominently the rise of other policy goals. Three such goals undermined the program of price stabilisation in
the 1930s and 1940s: full employment, ”low” interest rates, that is interest rates below the market rate, and a
fixed exchange rate for the domestic currency.
48 The number is calculated from Mitchell (1992).26
with full employment as their main platform will gain support – similar to the pattern of
the 1930s.
The search for culprits for the depression will be hectic. A game of finding suitable
institutions and policy-makers on whom to blame the macroeconomic misfortunes will
ensue. There is a great risk that the ECB will be chosen as the favorite target for the
critique. It is an organization outside the traditional nation state, the euro is a new
invention and the decision-makers in the ECB in Frankfurt are unfamiliar to many. Even if
the ECB policies are not the cause of the depression, it will be impossible for the ECB to
avoid being pulled into this blame-game.
Pressure would be strong for a change in the stance of monetary policy in the euro area. As
no central bank exists in a vacuum in a democratic society, independent of public opinion,
the ECB will sooner or later feel obliged to replace – at least temporarily – its present
policy of price stability with a different one. Most probably the ECB will settle for a more
expansionary monetary stance, with lower interest rates and more rapid growth in the
money supply. Such a policy may eventually raise the rate of inflation above the critical
level of two per cent. The credibility of the price stability goal of the ECB will be
undermined. The credibility of the ECB as an institution will be determined by the
perceived outcome of the policy change. Deep and wide-reaching unemployment in the
future thus may constitute a major challenge to the policy paradigm of EMU.
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ii. Slow growth and stagnation
Suppose that the euro area will display price stability during the first decade of the new
century - while at the same time European growth performance falls clearly below that of
the rest of the world, notably that of the United States and the non-euro members of the
EU. As a consequence, the euro area will appear as a region of relative stagnation in the
world economy – a case of failed policies. Such an outcome is not unrealistic according to
those commentators who argue that “eurosclerosis” – allegedly caused by heavy
regulations, lack of competition, extended welfare systems distorting incentives for work,
strong trade unions etc - causes slow growth in euro area.
A long period of slow growth and relative stagnation of the euro area may foster demands
for a change in ECB policy. The ECB and the euro then run the risk of being the focal
point for critique dragged into the blame-game concerning economic stagnation. Actually,
there were signs of such a process prior to the rapid decline in US growth at the end of
2000.
History suggests that demands for growth-enhancing monetary measures foster “cheap
money” policies, aimed at facilitating investments by holding interest rates below market
rates. This was the case in several European countries after World War II, when interest
rates were kept low by direct controls combined with regulations of the flow of credit and
capital to insure that industries and sectors given political priority obtained subsidized
financing.
49 Today, central bankers commonly try to minimize the threat of high unemployment by asking for supply
side measures to reduce present levels of unemployment. Much of current debate on how to cure
unemployment in Europe deals with supply side policies. However, higher levels of unemployment than
those of today will most likely be regarded as the outcome of insufficient demand, requiring demand policy
measures.27
A cheap money policy would fundamentally change the policy paradigm of EMU. It would
bring about a regulation of financial markets within EU, as investment decisions are
brought into the political sphere again, and undermine the free flow of capital within the
euro area as well as across the borders between the EMU and the rest of the world. Before
this phase, weaker forms of growth-enhancing measures may be taken, like subsidies to
investment projects favored in the political process. In addition, a cheap money policy will
cause inflation to re-appear, as a policy of keeping interest rates below market rates tends
to lead to money supply creation.
iii. A fixed exchange rate for the euro
By tradition, central banks - in particular in countries not producing a reserve currency -
have been opposed to flexible exchange rates. They have viewed a fixed exchange rate for
the domestic currency as the central method of achieving monetary stability.
50 This
propensity to hold exchange rates constant is deeply rooted among most central banks, not
least those now forming the ECB. The creation of the euro may actually be regarded as a
victory for the central bank view that a system of (irrevocably) fixed exchange rates is the
route to achieve monetary stability within Europe.
In the fall of 2000, the euro-dollar rate was a source of controversy. Various suggestions
for stabilizing or influencing the rate were presented. In the future, should the exchange
rate of the euro display large and volatile fluctuations, requests for a change in the policy
paradigm of EMU may arise.
51 A fixed rate for the euro to the dollar or other attempts by
the ECB to influence the external value of the euro would undermine the credibility of the
price stability goal. No longer would price stability be the sole and single policy objective
of the ECB.
iv. Lack of macroeconomic leadership
International monetary cooperation is facilitated by a strong power, a hegemon, accepting
economic and political leadership.
52 The United Kingdom served as such a power during
the classical gold standard. The United States held a similar position during the Bretton
Woods period. When British and American leadership was weakened and challenged, this
contributed to the downfall of the gold standard and the Bretton Woods system,
respectively. Within monetary unions, the role of a monetary leader is important too.
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Germany was the macroeconomic hegemon within Europe during the establishment of the
EMU. The German view on demand management was codified in the statues of the EMU,
the SGP and the ECB. As a result of this pervasive impact, active demand management
through monetary policy is not presently an option for European policy-makers. In the
process of building EMU, however, the power of the Bundesbank – the major force behind
50 On the evolution of the goals of central banks, see for example Capie et. al. (1994).
51 Robert Mundell has recently recommended a fixed exchange rate between the Euro, the dollar and the yen,
that is he views the world as the optimal currency area.
52 See Eichengreen (1990) for a survey of theories of hegemonic stability within the international monetary
system.
53 The Federal Reserve Bank in New York holds such a position in the US monetary union. According to our
previous discussion, centralized monetary unions have a larger survival prospect than decentralized unions.
The reason is that a centralized union, by definition, has a common “leader”.28
Germany’s macroeconomic leadership – has been reduced, as the Bundesbank is now one
of many central banks influencing the ECB’s decisions.
During the coming decade, so critical for the performance of the euro, the euro area would
benefit from a macroeconomic leadership that fosters consensus about demand side as well
as about supply side (growth) policies. Such a leadership would strengthen the present
policy paradigm and reduce the risk of changes to it. However, it is unclear at this point of
time if any macroeconomic leader will emerge in the coming decade within the euro area
similar to the role previously played by Germany. Besides, Germany has not been keen to
serve as a leader concerning supply side policies.
vi. A new macroeconomic orthodoxy
The thinking of the economics profession exercises a strong – but often indirect and lagged
– influence on the design of economic policies. Economists at universities follow actual
economic events in society; they interpret them and are prone to present advice to the
public and to policy-makers when they feel that outcomes can be improved upon. A
superior way to make a scientific career, and to gain esteem and respect in the academic
community, is to replace an old theory with a new one. As in all scientific disciplines, the
field of economics is in a state of constant re-thinking and questioning of prevailing
theories and notions.
This is particularly the case of monetary theory and policy as monetary issues often make
headline news, thus making them a common concern to society. Hicks (1967, p 157)
makes this point succinctly:
“Monetary theory is less abstract than most economic theory; it cannot avoid a relation to
reality, which in other economic theory is sometimes missing. It belongs to monetary
history, in a way that economic theory does not always belong to economic history. … a
large part of the best work on Money is topical. It has been prompted by particular
episodes, but particular experiences of the writer’s own time. … So monetary theories arise
out of monetary disturbances.”
Presently, the economics profession, although not a homogenous group, is roughly in
agreement with the ECB policy paradigm. However, this may change for a number of
reasons. The most likely would be a major economic disturbance, which would inspire new
ideas and models for monetary policy-making. History demonstrates several episodes
where the basic economic theory for stabilization has changed, most prominently in the
1930s and again in the 1970s and 1980s.
Should the economics profession change its views on EMU and its goal of price stability in
the future, the credibility of the ECB will be weakened. The greater the convergence and
consensus on a new macroeconomic approach, the more likely a change in the policy
paradigm for the ECB. The new model of stabilization policies will eventually flow from
universities and research institutes into central banks – although the lags are long and
variable.
vii. The danger of successful price stabilization
Another challenge to price stability – and indeed a highly unconventional one - is whether
the ECB actually will succeed in keeping inflation low and stable during the coming
decade. By achieving low and stable inflation for a long time, the ECB runs the risk of29
making voters and policy-makers forget the benefits of price stability and whet their
appetites for other goals. A country that has gone through high inflation or hyperinflation
tends to get “inoculated” against inflation as long as the scars of high inflation are vivid in
the minds of those who make economic policies. Once these generations are gone, the anti-
inflationary stance may be weakened.
This pattern is similar to the impact of collective traumas like World Wars I and II on
policy-making in a large number of fields, from security and foreign policy-making to the
field of economics.
54 The Rome treaty and the European union should be looked upon as
the response of those who had the experience of World War I and II in their minds.
Likewise the EMU should be looked upon as the result of the high and variable inflation of
the 1970s and 1980s as well as the monetary instability of Germany during and after the
world wars, making Germany more price stability oriented than countries with less violent
inflation histories.
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If the ECB manages to keep inflation low in the coming ten years, it may face pressure to
aim at other goals as well, like full employment and growth. The ECB may also be tempted
to fine-tune price level behavior in the short run. Such a process took place in the 1960s
and the 1970s within the Keynesian policy paradigm when belief in the power of counter-
cyclical policies was at its height. Stabilization policies went from “coarse” to “fine”
tuning, which contributed to the high inflation of the 1970s and 1980s in many European
countries, and eventually, to the collapse of the dominance of the Keynesian paradigm.
Central banks do change their policy paradigms over time. The US Federal Reserve
System today responds in a way different from the pattern in the 1970s. The ECB has
chosen to narrow down the range of its options by announcing a strict target range for price
stability, thus preempting a more flexible interpretation. Still, the ECB may open up for
other definitions of its objective function in the future, albeit at the risk of a reduction in its
credibility.
To sum up, the policy paradigm of the EMU may be challenged in the future for a number
of reasons. The process of changing the policy paradigm would be a complicated one,
probably beginning with one or a few countries recommending a new policy approach,
trying to convince other EMU-members to concur. The rise of such a split in opinions may
be due to different macroeconomic outcomes and/or different evolutions of macro-
economic thinking/theories among the members of the euro area.
6. Summary
The creation of EMU is a gigantic experiment, probably the most gigantic monetary
experiment in European history – and we have the privilege of seeing it unfolding before
our eyes. How will this experiment evolve over the coming ten years? We have considered
54 See for example Bennet and Howlett (1992), May (1973) and Rose (1993) on how policy-makers are
influenced by the “lessons” of past events when forming current policies. Jonung (2001) is an application of
this approach to the framing of stabilisation policies.
55 It was Gorbatchov – the first Soviet leader with no personal experience of World War II – that was ready to
accept a Soviet withdrawal from East Europe. Most likely, Soviet leaders prior to him would not have
contemplated such a retreat, given their first-hand experience of World War II.30
the first decade of the euro by using the history of monetary unions and stabilization
polices to answer two questions: first, how sustainable is the EMU, and second, will EMU
manage to deliver price stability? True, history is not a perfect guide to the future. No such
guide exists. The answers presented here are highly tentative and speculative. They are not
forecasts in the traditional sense, rather attempts to describe some scenarios and some
possible policy responses. Given these reservations, the answers to the two questions can
be summarized as follows.
Concerning the first question about the sustainability of EMU, our major assumption is that
EMU is organized as a centralized monetary union. Such unions have in the past proved to
be permanent arrangements, usually as long lasting as the nation states to which they have
been connected. The history of centralized monetary unions suggests that the shortcomings
of the EMU identified by economists – such as problems concerning the fiscal and
monetary policy-making processes, Europe not being an optimal currency area and the lack
of political legitimacy for the euro - are likely to be remedied or reduced in an ongoing
process of learning and adaptation by policy-makers in the euro area. They will suggest
corrections and modifications that promise to maintain the system in the future. The EMU
will thus change and adapt in response to the challenges it will face. EMU was created by a
desire to unify Europe by a common currency. This political determination is the glue that
maintains European monetary unification.
The endurance prospect of EMU increased considerably when the national currencies of
the euro area were eliminated in January 2002. As Europeans get used to their new
common currency and begin to forget their old national currencies, the euro will get a life
of its own. The window to the monetary past will be closed. The euro is now accepted as a
normal element in daily transactions, as was the case of the former national currencies.
Concerning the second question about the price stability of the EMU in the coming ten
years, it is more difficult to provide a straightforward answer. At the beginning of the new
century, the euro area has achieved a monetary and fiscal stability, which stands out as
unique from a historical point of view. It is quite an achievement in its own right. The
current situation has great similarities with the macroeconomic record in Europe during the
classical gold standard. This comparison suggests that price stability will be successfully
maintained in the coming ten years given that the policy makers of the EMU adhere to
rules similar to those of the gold standard, and given that the European future will be free
from major macroeconomic shocks.
The actual inflation performance of the euro zone up to 2010 will depend on the type of
shocks the euro area will be subject to. In the 20
th century fiscal shocks – caused by wars –
were the major threat to price stability in the euro area. This is not a likely inflationary
force within EMU in the coming ten years. Fiscal shocks may still be a threat but only in
the case that budget deficits are monetized by the ECB – an outcome that runs counter to
the rules of the system.
The policy paradigm underlying the price stability program of the EMU may also be
subject to shocks. The existence of the EMU and the euro is based on a common notion of
the proper macroeconomic model and macroeconomic theory to be used for framing
monetary policy within the euro area. If this paradigm is changed in the future, the goals of
the ECB may be changed accordingly, replacing price stability with other objectives.
Although, the risk of such a policy change appears to be remote for the immediate future,
history has witnessed in the recent past major changes in the policy paradigm of central
banking.31
As stressed above, this study is an exercise in hypothetical thinking about the future of the
EMU and the euro using the past as a guide. The most probable scenario for the future is
that none of the scenarios considered here will actually take place and that none of the
challenges to the EMU that has been considered here will turn out to be a major issue.
Something else will be on the top of the policy agenda for the EMU in the coming ten
years. The monetary future is full of surprises.32
Appendix A. Is the euro bound to happen? A counterfactual exercise
Our basic forecast is that by year 2010 Europe will have successfully been dominated by
EMU and the euro, that is by truly fixed exchange rates between at least 12 EU members
for a full decade. By year 2010 almost all EU members, including those taking part in the
enlargement, will also be members of EMU or connected to the euro through various fixed
exchange rate arrangements.
Europe will thus have experienced ten years of far-reaching monetary unification. One way
to demonstrate the political economy of monetary cooperation is to discuss counterfactual
outcomes illustrating how the European Union would have fared without monetary
unification, that is without the euro. Such an explicit construction is rarely made – although
it is implicit in much of the discussion of the future of the EMU.
The first step in our counterfactual exercise is to answer the question: Which exchange rate
system would characterize Europe were the euro not introduced? Given the crucial
assumption that no controls on capital flows are introduced within the EU prior to 2010,
the answer seems fairly straightforward.
In a Europe of free and unregulated capital flows, pegged exchange rate systems of the
Bretton Woods type will not be a viable option. Pegged rates would sooner or later induce
speculative attacks, bringing down the pegged rates. This was the fundamental lesson of
the currency and financial crises of the 1990s throughout the world, from Europe to Latin
America and Asia. Countries like Finland, Sweden and the UK were forced to adopt
floating rates in the wake of the ERM-crisis and chose to introduce inflation targeting in
the first half of the 1990s. The rise of a highly liquid international capital market – a
crucial part of the globalization process – has fundamentally changed the framework for
monetary policy-making in Europe.
Two alternative exchange rate options thus remain to be considered in a Europe without
the euro: either freely floating rates or close monetary cooperation based on more
permanently fixed rates than under pegged systems. Both are likely to be adopted judging
from the present international pattern outside the European continent. Several small EU-
countries will, under these circumstances, choose close monetary cooperation with a major
nearby monetary power. Austria, Denmark, Holland, Belgium and the Czech republic will
gravitate towards Germany, establishing fixed rates to the German currency, in a way
similar to the situation before the launch of the euro. This will also be the case of candidate
countries like Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria and several Balkan countries, adopting currency
board like arrangements.
Large EU-countries, on the other hand, will be prone to settle for floating exchange rates,
probably combined with inflation targeting (price stabilization programs).
56 In short,
besides Germany (or the German monetary area), Italy, France, Spain and the United
Kingdom will most likely all have floating rates vis-a-vis each other. These five countries
are too big to fix their rates vis-a-vis each other in a credible way – without forming a
monetary union - and each of them is too small to fully dominate the monetary landscape
56 Inflation targeting has been adopted by a growing number of countries in the past decade. This is the case
of New Zealand, Canada, Australia, and Brazil. The alternative is close monetary coordination through
currency boards or outright dollarization (Equador, El Salvador).33
of EU, with the exception of Germany. Thus EU will be divided into several major
currency areas, with its smaller members like Finland, Sweden, Ireland, Greece and
Portugal forming a monetary periphery of floating rates or being monetary satellites to
larger currency planets.
How then will the described exchange rate system within Europe work? Let us consider
three competing scenarios. All three will indicate, however, identical outcomes of the
monetary and exchange rate politics in Europe. The scenarios are based on the political
economy of exchange rate arrangements.
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Scenario 1. Well-behaved exchange rate movements
In this first scenario, such a system - given that it is based on a common monetary policy
goal like price stability adopted domestically by every EU-member - will function
smoothly and efficiently just as proposed by adherents of flexible rates. Movements in
exchange rates will not be a major source of disturbances, instead they will reflect
fundamentals, displaying the isolation properties as suggested by the standard theory of
floating rates. Asymmetric shocks within the EU-area will be efficiently handled by proper
movements in exchange rates maintaining Europe-wide macroeconomic stability and
growth. Overshooting will not be a problem. Trade, foreign investments and the growth of
Europe will not be hindered, but enhanced by this arrangement.
European integration may continue in all other areas except within the field of monetary
issues. Even in monetary matters there is scope for some coordination. The EU may make
recommendations concerning the proper domestic rate of inflation that each individual EU-
member should aim for to establish overall European price stability, similar to the advice
and surveillance carried out centrally in fiscal and budgetary affairs presently.
Let us assume that such a system of floating exchange rates - as outlined above - will be
perceived as functioning smoothly for a long time, say a decade, that exchange rate
fluctuations are viewed as small and insignificant, and that all EU-members successfully
maintain domestic price stability.
Under these circumstances there will be strong incentives for measures of establishing and
maintaining stable exchange rates. Central banks will be tempted to introduce a system of
fixed rates – the traditional propensity of central banks in Europe since their establishment
- and so will politicians in Europe. The likely outcome will be a locking of European
exchange rates and a process of monetary unification ending in a monetary union of EU, a
different route to EMU than the actual one though the end result will be roughly the same.
Scenario 2. Politically unacceptable exchange rate movements
The second scenario denies that a system of floating exchanges based on domestic price
stability will be a viable and stable long-run alternative accepted by the political system.
Instead, it will gradually gravitate towards either a common European currency or a
dissolution of the European Union into a Europe of nation states based on protectionism
and cross-border regulations of the movement of capital and people, similar to the case of
the Europe of the 1930s after the collapse of the international gold standard.
58 The reasons
for this scenario are found in the political economy of floating exchange rates.
57 See Frieden (1993, 1994) for an analysis of the political economy of exchange rate systems.34
The recent past has witnessed overshooting and persistent movements in the exchange rate
of floating currencies such as the dollar, the British pound, the yen and the euro – at least
as perceived by many commentators. This may also be the case within a Europe of at least
half a dozen major currencies. Exchange rate movements may be considerable, even
assuming that each central bank aims for price stabilization. The credibility of a domestic
goal such as price stability will continuously be put to the test, initiating speculation and
thus exchange rate movements. Some countries may not be able to muster the credibility
needed and may instead fall back on other goals for monetary and fiscal policy, causing
uncertainty about the future of price stabilization among its neighbors as well. Populist
politicians may ask for measures that are inconsistent with price stability.
Differences in economic policies within the nation states of Europe may set off financial
market reactions. Financial market actors will closely follow upcoming elections. They
will be the source of speculation and thus of exchange rate fluctuations. Facing such pre-
election speculations, central banks may feel forced to raise domestic interest rates, which
will have domestic political repercussions, weakening the political legitimacy of the
system of floating rates and of free capital mobility within the EU. Speculation will be
described in the popular rhetoric as a danger to democracy – as has already been the case
in several European countries.
Perceived excessive exchange rate movements will have major political and economic
impact among European countries: the smaller the country, the larger the impact - even if
economists can explain them as rational, reflecting fundamental forces.
59 However, finding
credible theoretical evidence is hardly likely, as there is no firm theory for exchange rate
fluctuations for the short and medium term, the pertinent time perspective in a political
context.
Suffice it to say is that there is a great risk that movements in exchange rates will be judged
by the electorate as large, excessive and unnecessary. History shows that whenever an
important price moves – like the price of energy, the price of foodstuff, the price of
housing or the exchange rate - it easily becomes “politicized”. Groups in societies,
considering themselves adversely affected, will demand political measures.
History shows a number of political reactions towards perceived excessive exchange rate
fluctuations. First of all, central banks, even a central bank like the ECB in 2000, covering
most of the EU-area, and the Bank of Sweden in 2001, may display a propensity to
intervene to reduce volatility. This pattern emerges in spite of the fact that the central bank
has declared price stability as its goal and in spite of strong empirical evidence indicating
the ineffectiveness of interventions in the markets for foreign currencies.
Secondly, perceived excessive exchange rate volatility poses a major threat to cross-border
capital flows. A potential political reaction would be the re-introduction of controls on
capital flows, like the recent case of Malaysia, reducing the free movement of capital.
Another politically tempting step would be schemes for taxation of international capital
flows, i.e. the use of Tobin taxes. Controls will – judging from the history of price controls
58 See for example Aldcroft and Oliver (1998) for a description of the monetary chaos that flexible exchange
rates were believed to create in the 1930s.
59 The smaller the country, the greater the propensity to adopt a fixed exchange rate. Andorra, Monaco,
Liechtenstein and Luxembourg are European illustrations of this proposition.35
– first be introduced in mild doses, and as they fail and create disappointment, stronger
medicine will gradually be prescribed.
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A third effect of politically sensitive exchange rate fluctuations is that demands will be
induced through the political system, asking for protection for industries and sectors
perceived as negatively affected. Tariffs, non-tariff barriers to trade and subsidies are likely
outcomes. Even if the initial change in the exchange rate is reversed, regulations on
international trade and subsidies tend to remain in place.
To sum up our second scenario, the political economy of excessive exchange rate
movements suggests that such movements would be a major threat to the single market, to
the free flow of capital, services and goods and eventually, to the whole European Union
project. Under these circumstances, politicians across the EU-area will neither be able to
maintain a system of floating exchange rates between the major currencies of Europe, nor
support the free flow of capital and goods. Instead they will eventually settle either for a
break-up of the EU or a more intensive and closer European monetary cooperation.
Given the benefits of economic integration and of international trade compared to the costs
of autarchy, the most likely result will be a drive for a version of a European monetary
union and a common currency. EMU will thus reappear in new clothing, this time based on
the negative experience of the highly volatile exchange rates of the first decade of the 21
st
century - and not on the high and volatile inflation of the 1970s and 1980s. The basic
mechanism behind European monetary unification is still the same: the quest for
establishing monetary stability and enforcing political unity and cooperation. The likely
outcome is the same.
Scenario 3. German monetary dominance
A third counterfactual scenario of EU without the EMU stresses competition among the
currencies of EU in a system of floating rates in Europe. In this process the German mark
will be the most credible and attractive product. Other national European currencies will
gradually gravitate towards the D-mark zone. Countries like Italy, Spain and France will
try to tie their currencies to the German mark at fixed rates. The candidate countries of
Eastern Europe will move to the mark in various arrangements similar to that of Estonia
which adopted the mark in the early 1990’s as the reserve currency for its currency board.
Eventually the major share of Europe will be a Mark zone.
Such a D-markization of Europe will create political tensions, reactions and demands.
Members of the EU will want to share the monetary power held by Germany. They will
ask for cooperation concerning European monetary policies. In the long run, it will be
difficult for Germany to resist such requests. It will be ready to surrender its currency in
exchange for guaranties that the German approach is accepted as the norm for European
monetary and fiscal policies. EU will take steps for establishing a European institution to
form a common monetary policy. Eventually, a new type of EMU will emerge as part of
the integration of Europe. Here monetary unification will follow as a consequence of
political integration of Europe.
60 This is the dynamics of price controls – they tend to start as guidelines and oral pressure-gentlemen’s
agreements but end with legally binding regulations. See e. g Jonung (1990) on the political economy of
price controls.36
Summary
According to these three counterfactual scenarios to EMU, monetary unification within
Europe appears to be a deterministic process: the euro seems bound to appear even if the
Maastricht treaty had not introduced it. This is too strong a conclusion to draw. Of course,
the future can take other turns than moving Europe towards a monetary union. If this is the
case, strong economic and political forces will still exist pressing towards monetary
unification within EU. The political system in Europe appears to display the propensity to
take almost any behavior of exchange rates as an argument for closer monetary
cooperation, thus pushing Europe towards one common currency.37
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Comments: Cases with no central banking are not covered by the table.TABLE 2. The rate of inflation (per cent per year), public debt to GDP (in per cent) and central government budget deficits in the















Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Rate of Inflation 0.2 3.1 19.0 13.6 3.6 11.6 27.7 59.1 4.9 8.9 6.3 4.6 1.8 0.7
Public Debt
%o fG D P
69.7 44.5 69.3 49.8 78.6 42.0 96.0 116.4 40.2 39.0 44.2 31.7 62.3 36.9
Central Govt Budget
Deficit
%o fG D P
1.5 7.8 19.3 44.9 0.3 27.2 35.6 46.8 5.2 16.6 5.0 9.3 -2.3 40.4
Data source: Bordo and Jonung (2001).
Comments: The Euro-5 area encompasses Germany, France, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. The table is based on unweighted averages.44












































































































































































































































































Chart 3. Central government budget deficit as a percentage of national income in the EU-5-area,
1880-2000. Annual average.
-40
-30
-20
-10
0
10
20
30
40
1
8
8
0
1
8
8
5
1
8
9
0
1
8
9
5
1
9
0
0
1
9
0
5
1
9
1
0
1
9
1
5
1
9
2
0
1
9
2
5
1
9
3
0
1
9
3
5
1
9
4
0
1
9
4
5
1
9
5
0
1
9
5
5
1
9
6
0
1
9
6
5
1
9
7
0
1
9
7
5
1
9
8
0
1
9
8
5
1
9
9
0
1
9
9
5
2
0
0
0
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
Classical
gold standard
EMU
runup
Inter-war
years
Bretton
Woods
Snake +
EMS
3